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FOREWORD
This is the pilot in a series of reports on strategic
planning conducted within the U.S. Department of Defense. It
focuses on the strategic planning responsibilities of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because planning at that
level provides the critical nexus between the strategic direction
provided by the National Command Authorities and its
implementation by the unified combatant commands and military
departments. The authors’ thorough understanding of the statutory
requirements for strategic planning and the interactions between
the Chairman’s complex strategic planning process and other key
DOD planning systems enables them to explicate today’s strategic
planning challenges and offer insightful recommendations.
Strategic planning in the post-Cold War era has proven to be
exceptionally problematic. The plethora of national and
international tensions that the east-west confrontation of the
Cold War in large measure subdued combine now to create a world
replete with diverse challenges to U.S. interests. Equally
disturbing is the fact that these challenges are not as clearly
defined and easily articulated as was the monolithic Soviet
threat. The authors point out that the Cold War provided inherent
stability in U.S. strategic planning and that the basic elements
of a strategic military plan evolved over time. They go on to
argue that the elimination of the National Military Strategy
Document and the abandonment of the Base Case Global Family of
Operation Plans amounted to recision of the Chairman’s strategic
plan, and that nothing has been developed to take its place.
In this thought-provoking study, the authors define a formal
strategic plan: one that contains specific  strategic objectives,
offers a clear and executable strategy for achieving objectives,
illuminates force capability requirements, and is harmonized with
the Future Years Defense Program. They discuss the reasons why a
strategic plan is needed and the value it would have in
coherently connecting the guidance provided by the National
Command Authorities to the integrated activities of the unified
commands, the Services, and other components of DoD. They
conclude by examining three alternatives to improve the strategic
planning processes and to facilitate efficient development of
strategic plans. They settle on a set of recommendations that
they believe would comprehensively link the major elements of
LY
current strategic planning, albeit modified in some cases, and
establish a clearer military foundation for DoD resource
decisions.
Thus, the National Military Strategic Plan, proposed by the
authors, would stand as the centerpiece of a system
incorporating:
• Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments;
• CINCs’ Integrated Priority Lists;
• The new Chairman’s Program Recommendation;
• The Unified Command Plan;
• The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan; and,
• Joint Military Net Assessments.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this
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The development of strategic plans by the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff should provide the critical nexus in
connecting the National Command Authorities’ strategic direction
of the U.S. armed forces with the planning and operations
conducted by the combatant commands and the support provided by
the Services and defense agencies. Title 10, United States Code,
establishes a structured hierarchy for strategic direction,
strategic planning, and contingency planning for the Department
of Defense. The Chairman is responsible for assisting the
National Command Authorities in their strategic direction
endeavors, for preparing strategic plans, and for providing for
the preparation and review of contingency plans. The absence of
strategic plans in the post-Cold War era has precluded the
identification and establishment of priorities for specific
strategic objectives, inhibited planning for future military
capabilities, and has not allowed for the integration of the
operation planning and theater strategies of the combatant
commands. Additionally, without strategic plans, there is a void
in the underlying rationale for the assignment of service
functions and the development of joint doctrine. This essay
defines “strategic plans” and offers an approach to their
development.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
• The Chairman should develop a National Military Strategic
Plan.
• The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan should continue in
its current form, but the guidance, force apportionments, and
taskings it provides should be based on the National Military
Strategic Plan.
• The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments should be
reoriented so they evaluate, integrate, and prioritize the CINCs’
requirements.
• The JROC should be divested of its oversight
responsibility for the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments
reaffirming its original charter. Oversight of the Joint
Warfighting Capability Assessments should become a Director of
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the Joint Staff responsibility on behalf of the Chairman and the
Vice Chairman.
• The Chairman’s Program Recommendation should be published
as a product of the reoriented Joint Warfighting Capability
Assessment process.
• Assessment of force capabilities, strengths and
deficiencies identified by the CINCs should be based on the
National Military Strategic Plan.
• The evaluation, integration, and establishment of
priorities for the CINCs’ requirements should be based upon the
National Military Strategic Plan.
• DoD should discontinue use of Defense Planning  Guidance
scenarios in the development of service programs in favor of
conformance to the National Military Strategic Plan.
(Note: The full set of recommendations derived from this
study begins on page 31.)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGIC PLANNING:
THE MISSING NEXUS
Introduction.
Strategic planning is a challenging, but necessary, endeavor
for any organization, small or large. For the U.S. Department of
Defense (DoD) it is a sacred responsibility to the Nation.
President Eisenhower said in 1958, “No military task is of
greater importance than the development of strategic plans which
relate our revolutionary new weapons and force deployments to
national security objectives.”1 In spite of its attention to
strategic planning, DoD has not enjoyed great success in this
area. For example, in 1985, a congressional staff report
characterized DoD’s strategic planning in the following manner:
Inattention to strategic planning has led to numerous
deficiencies, including a lack of clarity of DoD’s
strategic goals. The stated goals are vague and
ambiguous. In an organization as large as DoD, the
clear articulation of overall strategic goals can play
an important role in achieving a coordinated effort
toward these goals by the various components and
individuals within them. Clarity of goals can enhance
unity and integration. DoD loses the benefit of this
unifying mechanism through its failure to clarify its
strategic goals. To correct this problem and other
strategic planning deficiencies, DoD needs to establish
and maintain a well-designed and highly interactive
strategic planning process.2
Following up on this staff finding, Congress, in the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986 (GNA), prescribed for DoD a hierarchical process for
strategic direction, strategic planning, and contingency planning
for the U.S. Armed Forces.3 This process was designed to improve
strategic planning by harmonizing strategic direction and
planning with the development of defense programs that would
enable DoD to achieve its strategic goals. It was also designed
to integrate and rationalize the strategic and operational
planning conducted by the combatant Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs).
To these ends, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
was assigned key and specific responsibilities.4 Since passage of
the GNA, which is now codified in Title 10, United States Code
(10 USC), the JCS and then the Chairman have developed,
implemented, and revised specific processes for fulfilling most
of these statutory responsibilities.
Enactment of the GNA notwithstanding, strategic planning
currently conducted by the Joint Staff, on behalf of the
Chairman, does not adequately establish and specify strategic
objectives nor does it integrate and establish priorities for
them. In short, current strategic planning  for the U.S. Armed
Forces is of limited use in planning for future military
capabilities and integrating the planning conducted by the CINCs.
It should ensure that both of these efforts conform to national
military and security objectives. Equally disturbing, it does not
provide sufficient underlying rationale for the review of service
functions nor does it provide unequivocal and compelling bases
for the development and implementation of joint doctrine.
This essay will describe and assess the strategic direction
and planning processes used by the Chairman, identify and discuss
difficulties with the extant processes, and assess potential
solutions. It will focus on the strategic planning conducted at
the Chairman’s level because that planning should provide the
critical nexus between national security policy formulation and
the execution of that policy by the CINCs. It should also serve
as the critical link between the requirements of the CINCs and
the programs designed by the Services to meet those requirements.
We recognize that substantial and ultimate responsibility
for strategic direction and strategic planning resides with the
Secretary of Defense and President, and that the processes they
use and the products they produce affect the efforts of the
Chairman. Therefore, this essay will also examine and assess
aspects of the President’s National Security Strategy (NSS) and
the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) issued by the Secretary of
Defense to initiate the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System (PPBS).5
To provide a foundation for analysis, this essay will first
define “strategic plans” as used in the GNA and 10 USC. To frame
more clearly and describe the strategic planning responsibilities
of the Chairman, a brief review of the President’s and Secretary
of Defense’s roles in this arena will be conducted. Next an
examination of the current Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)
will be presented, followed by a discussion of many of the
strategic planning initiatives implemented since passage of the
GNA. Inadequacies within the current strategic planning processes
which inhibit their utility in assisting the Chairman in
providing integrated strategic advice to the National Command
Authorities (NCA)6 will be identified and assessed to show that
these deficiencies result from the absence of a comprehensive
strategic plan. The current planning processes produce a plethora
of documents designed to provide unified strategic direction to
the Services, CINCs and defense agencies, and timely military
advice to the National Command Authorities. However, assessments
of those documents reveal significant inadequacies because the
prime integrating document, a strategic plan, is absent. The
essay concludes with recommendations for changes in the current
strategic planning system.
Strategic Planning Defined.
At the outset, one must begin with a clear definition of
strategic planning, particularly strategic planning at the 
Chairman’s level. Although 10 USC requires the Chairman to
prepare strategic plans, it provides no convenient definition.7
The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms defines a “strategic plan” simply as “the plan for the
overall conduct of a war.”8 This definition is clearly deficient
since it is not in consonance with the statutory references to
strategic plans, nor does it allow for strategic planning, except
for war. One can, however, arrive at a useful definition by
determining the purposes for which strategic plans are intended.
The intent of the legislation can be determined by a review of
congressional action leading up to the passage of the GNA. Such a
review shows that strategic plans should enumerate specific
strategic objectives, identify fiscal and other constraints,
offer strategy for securing objectives, and play a key role in
determining force capability requirements.9
An amalgamation of the various specific references to
strategic plans within 10 USC provides a comprehensive
definition. These plans:
• are to be prepared by the Chairman and should conform to
the resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be
available for the periods during which the plans are to be
effective;
• should be useful for assessing the capabilities of U.S.
and allies’ armed forces versus potential adversaries;
• are differentiated from, and are a level above,
contingency plans prepared by the CINCs;10
• should serve as a standard against which force capability
strengths and deficiencies are measured;11
• should contain strategic priorities that can be used to
assess contributions of service programs;12 and,
• should integrate the theater strategies and plans of the
CINCs to ensure conformance to national military and security
objectives.13
From the above, one can distill a succinct definition of a
strategic plan that is appropriate for the strategic planning
requirements specified in 10 USC. It is a plan that specifies, in
military terms, the national strategic objectives for the defense
planning period under consideration (the Future Years Defense
Program–FYDP period) and describes a strategy that rationalizes
the resources expected to be available during the FYDP with the
strategic objectives described in the plan.14
To support further the intent of 10 USC, a strategic plan
must be based on a global perspective and should also provide:
• a definitive statement of strategic priorities;
• a means of providing unified, strategic direction for the
combatant commands;
• a template for formulating and assessing changes in the
assignment of service functions; and,
• a basis for strategic concepts upon which joint doctrine
should be based.
This definition and description of strategic plans are 
crucial in understanding the strategic planning responsibilities
specified in 10 USC and current imperfections in strategic
planning at the Chairman’s level.
Strategic Planning of the National Command Authorities.
The President. Atop the strategic planning hierarchy
presented in section 153 of 10 USC, rests the strategic planning
responsibilities of the President and the Secretary of Defense.
The National Security Act of 1947 (as amended) requires the
President to transmit to Congress each year, along with the
budget for the next fiscal year, a comprehensive report on the
U.S. national security strategy.15 The statute requires the
national security strategy report (National Security Strategy
[NSS]) to present the national security strategy of the United
States and a comprehensive description and discussion of the
following:
• the worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the
United States that are vital to the national security of the
United States;
• the foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national
defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter
aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the
United States;
• the proposed short-term and long-term uses of the
political, economic, military, and other elements of the national
power of the United States to protect or promote the interests
and achieve the goals and objectives referred to above;
• the adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to
carry out the national security strategy, including an evaluation
of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the
national power of the United States to support the implementation
of the national security strategy; and,
• such other information as may be necessary to help inform
Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of
the United States.16
Traditionally, however, administrations to varying degrees
have been loath to use the NSS as the effective policy instrument
envisaged by Congress. The most recent strategy, published in
February 1995, is entitled A National Security Strategy of
Engagement and Enlargement.17 As much as 20 percent of the
document is devoted to describing accomplishments of the current
administration.18 (Although this is not a novel use of the NSS,
there are more appropriate fora for reporting administration
accomplishments.19) While this NSS provides useful definitions of
“vital,” important," and “humanitarian” interests, a noteworthy
improvement over its predecessors, it does not describe specific
areas where those interests are at stake. Moreover, it does not
offer policy guidance establishing clear priorities of national
interests.20 In essence, therefore, the NSS generally describes
what is  to be accomplished, and to some extent how, but is not
sufficient to translate general policy into executable strategy.21
An assessment, therefore, of the NSS leads to the conclusion
that, in general, it is not the “comprehensive description and
discussion” required by the National Security Act of 1947 (as
amended by the GNA).22 While this is an important finding, it is
not damning with respect to the strategic planning for which the
Chairman is responsible. The NSS provides useful guidance for the
development of the National Military Strategy (NMS) and the
Chairman can develop the strategy in whatever degree of detail he
desires so long as it does not contradict any of the general
guidance contained in the NSS. The more general the NSS, the more
flexibility the Chairman enjoys in designing the NMS. Continuing
this logic a step further, one can conclude that the NSS would
not inhibit the development of strategic plans by the Chairman;
it is not sufficiently specific to have that effect.
The Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense is an
intended beneficiary, but not an author, of strategic plans.23
However, to complete an assessment of the policy guidance upon
which the Chairman bases his strategic planning, two of the
Secretary’s statutory responsibilities must be addressed. 10 USC
requires the “Secretary of Defense, with the advice and
assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, [to]
provide annually to the heads of the Department of Defense
components written policy guidance for the preparation and review
of program recommendations and budget proposals of their
respective components, including guidance on:
• national security objectives and policies;
• the priorities of military missions; and,
• the resource levels projected to be available for the
period of time for which such recommendations and proposals are
to be effective."24
To fulfill this responsibility, the Secretary publishes the
Defense Planning Guidance.25
It is a misperception that the strategic direction provided
in the National Security Strategy travels along two branches
within DoD, one to the Secretary of Defense who translates it
into the DPG, and the other to the Chairman who uses it to
develop the National Military Strategy. In actuality, the
branching of strategic direction occurs at the Chairman’s level,
and the DPG, although a Secretary of Defense document, is more
directly influenced by the Chairman’s strategy than by the NSS.26
Given this relationship, it can be concluded that the DPG neither
enhances nor inhibits the strategic planning of the Chairman.
However, the Secretary of Defense must provide the Chairman with
a realistic projection of the defense resource levels expected to
be available for the planning period under consideration.27 The
Chairman, in turn, is obliged to provide the Secretary of Defense
with key recommendations resulting from his strategic planning
which should inform  the development of the DPG. The Chairman’s
strategic planning provides the foundation for the first “P” in
the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System.28
However, the very general nature of the National Military
Strategy precludes its use as the vehicle for transmitting
specific recommendations. The DPG, itself, is a much more
comprehensive document than the National Military Strategy. It
reflects a great deal of strategic decisionmaking. It provides
some, but not necessarily clear, guidance on regional priorities
as well as some overall priorities for force planning.29 It also
provides general programming priorities and specific programming
guidance.30 Since the DPG offers no further elaboration on the
national security and military strategies than that contained in
the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy,
one could reasonably question the basis for the strategic
planning and programming decisions it reflects. Absent the
influence of strategic plans, and since the National Military
Strategy is not sufficiently specific to provide such a basis,
the DPG features Illustrative Planning Scenarios (IPS).
The IPSs are interesting inventions. They postulate, for
illustrative purposes, scenarios in which the United States,
perhaps with allies, becomes embroiled in conflict with
hypothetical adversaries. The scenarios are described in the
Defense Planning Guidance as reflecting some of the military
challenges anticipated over the Future Years Defense Program, but
are neither predictive nor exhaustive regarding those challenges,
and they are not intended to reflect policy decisions. These
qualifiers notwithstanding, the scenarios purportedly illustrate
the types of military capabilities needed, enable DoD components
to perform detailed program planning, provide a basis for
ensuring consistency among various DoD component programs, and
serve as analytical tools for evaluating component programs after
they are submitted.31
From this analysis, one may conclude that DoD develops
defense programs based on an incomplete set of capability
determinants that do not presume to predict future conflicts and
do not necessarily reflect current policy. Alternatively, a
comprehensive strategic plan would derive from an actual
assessment of the strategic environment over the Future Years
Defense Program, establish a priority for specific strategic
objectives achievable within that time frame, describe an
executable strategy for achieving those objectives, and define
the military capability required to effect the strategy. Rather
than basing program planning on hypothetical scenarios, it should
be based on tangible requirements distilled from the actual
strategic plan DoD intends to implement over the Future Years
Defense Program.
10 USC also requires the Secretary of Defense, with the
approval of the President, and after consultation with the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “[to] provide annually to
the Chairman written policy guidance for the preparation and
review of contingency plans. Such guidance  shall include
guidance on the specific force levels and specific supporting
resource levels projected to be available for the period of time
for which such plans are to be effective.”32 The vehicle used by
the Secretary of Defense to fulfill this responsibility is
entitled the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG).33
The CPG is a close-hold, highly classified document that is
significantly different in form and content from the Defense
Planning Guidance. Assessment of the CPG is limited by its
classification and restricted circulation. However, some
observations concerning its relationship to strategic planning
can be made. The CPG has limited direct impact on the Chairman’s
strategic planning. There is no traceable flow of strategic
direction from the CPG into the Chairman’s strategic planning
process. Additionally, there is no formal process by which
strategic planning conducted by the Chairman impacts the
Contingency Planning Guidance.34 The CPG is published annually
and, therefore, is a short range document.35 The annual policy
adjustments contained in successive CPGs may combine to indicate
the need for a renewed national military strategy but,
presumably, that need would have already been identified through
the Joint Strategy Review (JSR) process.36 Also, the highly
classified content of the CPG is directly translated into the
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and is not used as input
into the Chairman’s strategic planning process.37 Although the CPG
does not directly affect the Chairman’s strategic planning, it is
relevant in discerning the true nature of the JSCP.
The JSCP is the tool used by the Chairman to cause the CINCs
to prepare operation plans.38 10 USC assigns the Chairman the
responsibility for “providing for the preparation and review of
contingency plans which conform to policy guidance from the
President and the Secretary of Defense” and “[p]reparing joint
logistic and mobility plans to support those contingency plans
and recommending the assignment of logistic and mobility
responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those
logistic and mobility plans.”39 Policy set forth in the
Contingency Planning Guidance reaches the CINCs via changes to,
or republication of, the JSCP. The flow of strategic direction is
from the Contingency Planning Guidance to the JSCP, ultimately
resulting in new or revised operation plans.
After examining the significant National Command
Authorities’ influences on the Chairman’s strategic planning, we
find that while they may not provide comprehensive policy and
strategy guidance, they are not unduly constraining. We move now
to the crux of our assessment, the strategic planning conducted

by the Chairman.
The Chairman’s Strategic Planning.
During the period beginning with the passage of GNA in 1986
through the end of superpower confrontation in the early  1990s,
a series of events combined to render ineffectual the strategic
planning conducted at the Chairman’s level. Although the GNA
sought to improve strategic planning, by 1990 formal strategic
planning at the Chairman’s level was minimal.
The three principal strategic direction and planning
responsibilities assigned to the Chairman by GNA (codified in 10
USC) are to:
• “. . . [ assist] the President and the Secretary of
Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the armed
forces;”
• “[ prepare] strategic plans, including plans which conform
to the resource levels projected to be available for the period
of time for which the plans are to be effective” and to “. . .
[prepare] joint logistics and mobility plans to support those
strategic plans and recommending the assignment of logistic and
mobility responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with
those logistics and mobility plans;” and,
• “[conduct] net assessments to determine the capabilities
of the armed forces of the United States and its allies as
compared with those of potential adversaries.”40
Nominally, strategic planning at the Chairman’s level is
conducted principally within the Joint Strategic Planning System
(JSPS).
The Joint Strategic Planning System. The formal process
established to assist the Chairman in strategic planning is the
JSPS. At the time of passage of the GNA, the JSPS was defined by
JCS Memorandum of Policy 84 (JCS MOP 84). This MOP, first
published in 1952, survived until 1990 when it was replaced by
CJCS MOP 7.41 The MOP 84 version of the JSPS was unwieldy,
complex, and bureaucratic and produced no less than 10 major
documents every 2-year planning cycle.42 It was roundly criticized

by Congress and others.43 Nevertheless, planning under the
provisions of MOP 84 produced the National Military Strategy
Document (NMSD) and the Base Case Global Family of Operation
Plans, which collectively approached a strategic plan.44
Although the 1990 version of the JSPS (CJCS MOP 7) sought to
streamline the JSPS in order to make it more responsive “in a
rapidly changing national security environment,” it did not
survive a single planning cycle.45 This streamlined JSPS envisaged
one strategic planning process and three primary products:
• Joint Strategy Review (JSR) process;
• National Military Strategy Document;
• Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan; and,
• Chairman’s Program Assessment.
The new Memorandum of Policy described a system that began
with the Joint Strategy Review. The review was to determine if
the National Military Strategy should be changed.46 The NMSD was
to include the National Military Strategy, written and published
by the Chairman, but approved by the President. Additionally, the
NMSD was to  contain recommended national military objectives;
recommended fiscally constrained force levels; military strategy
and force options; and a risk assessment of the recommended
strategy, forces, and military options.47 The NMSD was also to
feature functional annexes to supplement the base document. The
annexes were to provide concise military taskings, priorities,
requirements, or additional guidance.48 The NMSD was to serve as
the Chairman’s advice to the Secretary of Defense with respect to
the development of the Defense Planning Guidance. The Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan, retained in CJCS MOP 7 as a key
product of the Joint Strategic Planning System, continued to
serve as the principal vehicle by which the CINCs were tasked to
develop global and regional operation plans.49
The final document prescribed by CJCS MOP 7 was the
Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA). It was to provide the
Chairman’s assessment of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM)
forces proposed by the Services.50 The CPA was to assist the
Secretary of Defense in making decisions on the defense program

subsequent to receipt of the POMs from the military departments
and other DoD components. It was to accomplish this in two ways.
First, it was to contain the Chairman’s assessment of the extent
to which the various service POMs conformed to the priorities
established in strategic plans and for the priorities established
for the CINCs’ requirements. Second, the CPA was to contain
alternative program recommendations to achieve greater program
conformance to established priorities.51 The 1990 version of the
Joint Strategic Planning System was aborted before completion of
the Joint Strategy Review, which led to yet another revision of
the process.
In mid-1992, the Joint Staff began revising CJCS MOP 7 to
make it more accurately reflect the manner in which joint
strategic planning had been conducted during 1990 and 1991. The
intent was to make it a less precise, more open-ended process
that afforded the Chairman greater flexibility in forging the
National Military Strategy. Feeling somewhat dis- enfranchised
from the process that produced the 1992 version of that document,
the Services and many of the CINCs resisted the Joint Staff’s
efforts to dismantle the formal system.52 The compromise that
resulted retained many of the original CJCS MOP 7 provisions, but
also featured several important changes. The most significant
change was elimination of the National Military Strategy Document
in favor of an unclassified, generalized National Military
Strategy.53 This, combined with the abandonment of the Base Case
Global Family of OPLANs, effectively eliminated the elements that
collectively served as a strategic plan. To date, nothing has
filled this planning void.
The new National Military Strategy took a form radically
different from that envisioned by the original CJCS MOP 7.54
Whereas the classified National Military Strategy Document
provided national military objectives, policy,  strategy, force
planning options and assessments, and risk evaluations; the
National Military Strategy, in its new form, did not address
national military objectives, but merely reiterated national
interests and objectives from the 1991 National Security
Strategy.55 While the national military strategy contained within
the National Military Strategy Document published in 1989
consisted of some 50-pages of text specifying strategic
objectives, assumptions, and priorities; the 1992 National
Military Strategy provided a 10-page discussion of what appears

to be national military doctrine, void of any specific strategic
objectives and priorities.56 It is interesting to note that
although the National Military Strategy, in its new form, lacks
the specificity of the strategy set forth in the National
Military Strategy Document, detailed operation planning guidance
and tasks continue to be given to the CINCs via the Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan. Hence, one might ask what is the
basis for translating the National Military Strategy into the
specific tasks and guidance contained in the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan?
The Joint Staff began implementation of CJCS MOP 7 (Revision
1), even before the revision was officially approved. A concerted
effort was made to adhere to the established procedures and time-
lines as closely as possible. The Joint Strategy Review was
initiated in the fall of 1992. By mid-summer 1993 a Joint
Strategy Review report was provided to the Chairman and work
subsequently began on a new National Military Strategy. However,
a number of factors delayed publication of the new National
Military Strategy until February 1995.57 Although more brightly
colored and featuring some new lexicon, the 1995 National
Military Strategy is of the same form and not substantially
different from its predecessor.58
The Chairman’s Strategic Plans: Current Lacunae.
Unified action of the armed forces is predicated upon
unified direction.59 The National Security Act of 1947 (as
amended) states that “. . . it is the intent of Congress to . . .
provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant
forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their
integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces
. . . .”
60
 In providing for the unified action and strategic
direction of the U.S. Armed Forces, the Chairman plays a critical
role as the key military advisor to the National Command
Authorities. His responsibilities in assisting the National
Command Authorities in this regard hinge upon his ability to
develop coherent strategic plans for the employment of the U.S.
Armed Forces. Effective strategic planning on the part of the
Chairman is a major determinant of the quality of the unified
strategic direction provided to the CINCs and the service
secretaries by the National Command Authorities.

Since the end of the Cold War, comprehensive strategic plans
 have not been developed. As a consequence, key planning
documents have not been based upon strategic plans of global
scope. Rather, they have been based upon ambiguous objectives and
a near term outlook.61 However, this is not to suggest that this
void in strategic planning be filled by a return to a global
family of operation plans and a national military strategy
document that contemplate global war. That is clearly
inappropriate. What is needed is a new type of strategic plan
that addresses the realities of the post-Cold War era.
For almost 50 years, the United States assumed the strategic
defensive in dealing with the containment of the monolithic
Soviet threat. Two generations of military strategic planners
have passed through this defensive strategic planning paradigm.
“Threat-based” planning became so inculcated into the military
culture that it became universally regarded as the only type of
military strategic planning that made sense.62 After the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, the U.S. military encountered great difficulty in
breaking out of the threat-based planning paradigm and entering
into a new era of objectives-based planning. The type of
strategic plan advocated in this essay is a proactive plan that
would enable the U.S. Armed Forces to contribute positively to
the international environment to further U.S. interests and
values. Such a proactive strategic plan would assist the Chairman
in fulfilling several of his statutory responsibilities.
The following analysis of current institutional tools for
achieving unified strategic direction of the U.S. Armed Forces
shows that their full potential must rest upon the Chairman’s
formulation of strategic plans.63
Unified Command Plan (UCP). 10 USC requires the Chairman to
“. . . review the missions, responsibilities (including
geographic boundaries), and force structure of each combatant
command; and . . . recommend to the President, through the
Secretary of Defense, any changes to such missions,
responsibilities, and force structures as may be necessary.”64 The
UCP establishes the broad missions, responsibilities, force
structure, and geographic areas of responsibility of the CINCs.65
The missions assigned by the UCP are significantly more general
than the specific tasks the Chairman assigns the CINCs in the
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Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.66 Like the National Military
Strategy, the UCP is a relatively general document while the
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is quite specific. The
Chairman’s task is to take the general strategic foundations and
principles presented in the National Military Strategy, translate
them into the broad CINC responsibilities presented in the UCP,
and then to further translate them into specific tasks to focus
the regionally oriented strategic and operational planning
conducted by the CINCs.67 The Chairman’s strategic planning should
point to the most appropriate combatant command structure; to
include assignment of geographic and  functional areas of
responsibility, enduring missions, and forces. In doing so, this
planning would enable the Chairman to assist in providing
globally integrated, strategic direction to the CINCs. However,
such direction cannot be logically derived from discrete
assessments of each region, but must be based on a strategic plan
of global scope. As stated earlier, given the current and
projected national security environments, the strategic plan
would not necessarily contemplate global war, but would provide
overarching rationale for the most appropriate unified command
structure.
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The Chairman is
responsible for ensuring that the deliberate operation plans of
the CINCs are integrated at the national level to effect the
policy guidance promulgated by the National Command Authorities.68
Through the JSCP, the Chairman causes the CINCs to prepare
contingency (operation) plans in support of national objectives.69
The JSCP contains a précis of the National Military Strategy,
general planning guidance to the CINCs, Armed Services and the
Defense agencies, specific planning tasks for each CINC, a
listing and apportionment (for planning) of the forces expected
to be available at the beginning of the plans’ effective period,
an intelligence estimate for planning, and other forms of
specific planning guidance.70 A close comparison of the National
Military Strategy to the JSCP reveals that a tremendous amount of
interpretation of the National Military Strategy is required to
translate this very general document into one which is much more
specific. One might ask how this interpretation of the National
Military Strategy is accomplished and where it is documented.
Without an overarching strategic plan, the basis for this
translation of the National Military Strategy into specific JSCP
guidance and tasks is unclear.
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The Joint Staff has asserted that the JSCP, as its name
implies, is a strategic plan. However, it does not satisfy the 10
USC description of a strategic plan. According to the Joint
Strategic Planning System (as described in CJCS MOP 7), the
purpose of the JSCP is to “[provide] strategic guidance,
including apportionment of resources, to the CINCs and the Chiefs
of the Services, to accomplish assigned strategic tasks based on
military capabilities existing at the beginning of the planning
period . . . [it is] the principal vehicle by which the CINCs are
tasked to develop global and regional OPLANs.”71 In revising CJCS
MOP 7 in 1993, the Joint Staff made no substantive changes in the
declared purpose of the JSCP, but added a provision that the JSCP
“fulfills the Chairman’s responsibility to ‘. . . prepare
strategic plans’ specified in 10 USC 153.”72 There was no such
claim made in the original CJCS MOP 7, nor in its predecessor,
JCS MOP 84.
In the JSCP itself, the Joint Staff describes the document’s
purpose: “. . . provides guidance to the CINCs and Chiefs of the
Services to accomplish tasks and missions  based on near-term
(emphasis added) military capabilities.” There is no claim that
it fulfills the Chairman’s responsibility for preparing strategic
plans.73 Additionally, the revised CJCS MOP 7 points out that the
JSCP is directly impacted by the Contingency Planning Guidance, a
near-term document revised or republished annually.74 Clearly,
therefore, the JSCP is structured primarily to cause CINCs to
prepare contingency (operation) plans and, by itself, does not
meet the 10 USC requirement for a strategic plan. However,
strategic planning conducted by the CJCS should provide the basis
for the JSCP. The Chairman’s strategic plan is critical in
linking the strategic direction provided by the National Command
Authorities to the disparate deliberate planning efforts of the
CINCs.
Force Strengths and Deficiencies. Contained within the
Contingency Planning and Preparedness paragraph of Section 153 of
10 USC is the requirement for the CJCS to “[advise] the Secretary
of Defense on critical deficiencies and strengths in force
capabilities . . . identified during the preparation and review
of contingency plans and assessing the effects of such
deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security
objectives and policy and on strategic plans.”75 Here again,
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strategic planning plays a key role. As the CINCs prepare their
operation plans and as the plans are reviewed, it is expected
that specific force capability strengths and deficiencies will be
illuminated. These strengths and deficiencies have relevance only
within the context of particular regional plans until the
Chairman performs an integrated assessment of them to determine
their impact on strategic plans, national defense policy, and
national security objectives. A strategic plan prepared by the
Chairman would provide the necessary standard against which force
capability strengths and deficiencies could be weighed from a
national perspective.
Integrating and Establishing Priorities for CINC
Requirements. Strategic plans would facilitate the fulfillment of
other responsibilities of the Chairman. If we combine the
responsibilities assigned in sections 153 and 163 of 10 USC, we
find the Chairman is responsible for soliciting the requirements
of the combatant commanders; evaluating, integrating, and
establishing priorities for their requirements; and advising the
Secretary of Defense of the commands’ requirements, individually
and collectively. Additionally, he is to advise the Secretary of
Defense on the extent to which service program recommendations
and budget proposals conform to the priorities established in
strategic plans and for the combatant commanders. This advice may
include alternative program recommendations that differ from
those submitted by the Services.76 By developing strategic plans,
the Chairman can establish appropriate rationale for the
priorities he assigns to the various requirements of the CINCs,
for his assessments of service programs, and for alternative
program recommendations he may submit to the Secretary of
Defense.  The absence of strategic plans has caused the Chairman
to devise other means of underpinning his recommendations,
specifically the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments
(JWCAs), the Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR), and the
linking of the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA) to the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council process.
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The revision of
the charter of the JROC and the initiation of Joint Warfighting
Capability Assessments by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff are recently implemented means for the Chairman to
develop and support recommendations concerning requirements for
military capability.77 Under its 1992 charter, the JROC was
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oriented toward reviewing, validating and approving requirements
for future military capabilities identified by the CINCs,
Services, and others.78 The 1995 revision of the charter
significantly expanded the mission and functioning of the JROC.
It now “[assists] the Chairman . . . in carrying out his
responsibilities to assess warfighting capabilities . . .[and] .
. . to assess the extent program recommendations and budget
proposals of Military Departments and DOD components conform with
established priorities.”79 In assessing warfighting capabilities
in addition to requirements for future capabilities, the JROC now
appears to be also concerned with current force capability
strengths and deficiencies, an area previously assessed by other
means.
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Assessment of current force strengths and deficiencies, to
include their “effect . . . on meeting national security
objectives and policy and on strategic plans,” is a task quite
dissimilar from identifying future force requirements. It is
clear 10 USC places responsibility for assessing current
capability on the Chairman but it is equally clear the CINCs are
to be principal participants.81 Bringing the assessment of current
force capability under the auspices of the JROC can have the
effect of emphasizing Service perspectives while marginalizing
the participation of the CINCs.82
Assessment of current force capability can serve two
important purposes. First, and most immediately, it can provide a
strategic level risk assessment with respect to the use of the
military element of national power. Secondly, but equally
important, it can provide strategic relevance to force capability
strengths and deficiencies identified by the CINCs by pointing
out which strengths and deficiencies really matter given the
priority of strategic objectives.83
The difficulty with the JROC assessing current military
capability is that contemporary deficiencies do not necessarily
translate into requirements for future capabilities. A
significant current force deficiency, one that may warrant a
major program, would take perhaps 10 years to result in a
compensating fielded capability. However, in the intervening
period, changes in the strategic environment, U.S. interests, and
national military strategy  may mitigate or eliminate the
deficiency. So we cannot base requirements for future
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capabilities on current deficiencies. If we were to do so, we
would always be developing and procuring capabilities to fight
the last war. To the extent the JROC assesses future capability
requirements, it relies on scenarios to extrapolate current
deficiencies into the future.84 A better approach would be to base
requirements on a strategic plan that anticipates the future
national security environment, projects and establishes a
priority for national military objectives, and provides the basis
for a national military strategy that rationalizes anticipated
resources with objectives.
Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR). The Chairman
recently introduced a new document, the CPR, by which he provides
programming advice to the Secretary of Defense. The purpose of
the CPR is to inject the Chairman’s advice into the Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System early enough to influence the
Defense Planning Guidance. It is purported to be an integration
of the views of the CINCs with those of the Chairman regarding
military requirements.85 CINCs formally submit their program
priorities, in the form of Integrated Priority Lists (IPL),
through the Chairman to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Program Analysis and Evaluation (ASD [PA&E]).86 The Integrated
Priority Lists are keyed to the Future Years Defense Program
under consideration. For example, the Integrated Priority Lists
for the FY 94-99 Future Years Defense Program were required to be
submitted in the fall of 1991 so they could influence the FY 94-
99 Defense Planning Guidance. However, the CPR is not based
principally on the CINCs’ Integrated Priority Lists, but on the
Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments performed under the
auspices of the JROC.87 The CPR should be based principally on the
Chairman’s evaluation, integration, and prioritization of the
CINCs’ Integrated Priority List. It should not depend on the
consensus of the JROC membership. Development of the CPR and its
submission to the Secretary of Defense is a noteworthy
initiative. Nonetheless, by basing it on the Joint Warfighting
Capability Assessments, its focus is directed away from the
requirements of the CINCs and toward the desires of the Services.
Orienting the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments more on
the requirements of the CINCs could overcome this problem;
however, this too would require integration by the Chairman based
on the global strategic perspective contained in a strategic
plan.
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Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA). In 1994, the JROC
became a principal participant in the development of the CPA.88
Prior to that time, no relationship between the JROC and the
Joint Staff’s CPA development efforts was apparent. In fact, they
were two separate and distinct activities. Notwithstanding this,
the CPA remains the Chairman’s principal tool for assessing the
extent to which the programs of the military departments and
other DoD components conform “. . . to the priorities established
in  strategic plans . . .” and to the “. . . priorities
established for the requirements of the CINCs.”89 The CPA is also
a vehicle by which the Chairman can offer alternative program
recommendations. Formally, it is a product of the Joint Strategic
Planning System that nominally serves as an interface with the
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System. The statute calls for
the Chairman to use the priorities established in strategic plans
and those he establishes for the requirements of the CINCs as the
bases for this assessment. Without strategic plans, there are no
articulated and documented strategic priorities. The requirements
of the CINCs are made known to the Chairman via the Integrated
Priority Lists. But the Chairman does not require the lists, nor
is he the principal user of the information they contain.
However, he should be. He should evaluate, integrate, and
prioritize them so that the programming advice he provides to the
Secretary of Defense in the Chairman’s Program Recommendation
synthesizes the requirements of all the CINCs in accordance with
the strategic plan for the Future Years Defense Program under
consideration. The CPA, like the Chairman’s Program
Recommendation, should also be strongly influenced by the
Integrated Priority Lists.
Force Capability Net Assessments. The Chairman has another
assessment responsibility that warrants review. The Strategic
Planning paragraph of Section 153, 10 USC requires the Chairman
to “[perform] net assessments to determine the capabilities of
the armed forces of the United States and its allies as compared
with those of their potential adversaries.”90 This assessment
responsibility is distinct from, and in addition to, that
contained in the Contingency Planning and Preparedness paragraph
of 10 USC.91 To fulfill this statutory requirement, the Chairman
has prepared, and the Secretary has submitted to the Congress,
Joint Military Net Assessments (JMNAs).
While the JMNAs may be useful for Congress in considering
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the merits of budget submissions and attendant Future Years
Defense Programs, they suffer from the same flaw as the Defense
Planning Guidance, i.e., they are scenario based. The placement
of this net assessment requirement in the Strategic Planning
paragraph of the Chairman’s functions section of 10 USC points
toward a congressional intent to have the assessments based on
strategic plans, not hypothetical scenarios. This makes eminent
sense. If a JMNA is based on an approved strategic plan, Congress
would be in a better position to judge the extent to which a
given Future Year Defense Program promises to achieve specific
national security and military objectives. Additionally, since
the scenarios do not reflect established policy, it is difficult
for Congress to discern how much weight the JMNAs should be
given. The less compelling Congress views the JMNAs, the more
difficult it will be for DoD to counter the congressional forces
that tend to suboptimize defense programs.
 Roles, Missions, and Functions. 10 USC requires the 
Chairman triennially to “submit to the Secretary of Defense a
report containing . . . recommendations for changes in the
assignment of functions (or roles and missions) to the armed
forces to achieve maximum effectiveness . . . .” In preparing the
report, the Chairman is to consider, inter alia, changes in the
threat, unnecessary duplication, and changes in technology that
can be applied effectively to warfare.92 Two such reports have
been produced since passage of the GNA. The first received little
notice; however, the second generated considerable controversy.
It was not that the report proposed radical changes, but that it
was perceived to be, more or less, an affirmation of the status
quo. This led to the establishment of the congressionally
mandated, independent Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM).93
The present Chairman has indicated that identification of needed
changes may be a task too difficult for DoD.94 Some argue that the
task also proved too difficult for the CORM.95 If recommended
changes to roles, missions, and functions were based, in part, on
approved strategic plans, the task of identifying needed changes
would be less difficult and the Chairman’s recommendations could
be better supported.
Joint Doctrine. 10 USC also gives the Chairman the
responsibility for the development of joint doctrine.96 The
relationship of strategic planning and joint doctrine is somewhat
opaque but, nevertheless important. The value of joint doctrine
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in improving joint (and unified)97 warfighting capability is
widely accepted. However, effective joint doctrine has additional
value. It can serve as information to senior civilian leadership
and governmental agencies as to how they may expect the armed
forces of the United States to be employed. It can also serve a
similar purpose for alliance and potential coalition governments
and armed forces, particularly apropos establishing the U.S.
national position for the development of multinational doctrine.98
The Chairman’s strategic planning can help uncover joint
doctrinal challenges, voids, and opportunities; thus providing
impetus for the development of new doctrine and revision of
extant doctrine. Additionally, the unifying effect of strategic
plans would enhance the implementation of joint doctrine across
Services and combatant commands.
Conversely, the absence of strategic plans gives rise to
disaggregated development of joint doctrine. Additionally,
without strategic plans the Services are less likely to implement
joint doctrine in a standardized fashion. Finally, without
strategic concepts that should be established in strategic plans,
there is no unified strategic basis for the development of joint
doctrine. Strategic plans would provide the critical linkage
between the National Military Strategy and the development and
implementation of joint doctrine.
The Missing Nexus in Strategic Planning.
Recent measures taken to overcome the inadequacies in
strategic planning have recognized and ameliorated some of  the
difficulties resulting from the absence of strategic plans, but
they do not directly or fully address the problem. These
initiatives, including expansion of the responsibilities of the
JROC, the initiation of Joint Warfighting Capability Assess-
ments, and linking the Chairman’s Program Assessment to the JROC
process, can be incorporated into a holistic solution and should
not be abandoned. Given the current state of the planning
processes at the Chairman’s level, there appear to be three
viable alternatives for correcting the deficiencies in strategic
planning:
• revising and expanding the National Military Strategy so
that it meets the requirements of a strategic plan;

• expanding the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan making it,
as its name implies, a joint strategic plan; or,
• creating a new document, the National Military Strategic
Plan (NMSP).
There may be other alternative solutions but these three are
directly supported by statute, are executable within the current
strategic planning framework, and do not require reengineering of
the Chairman’s strategic planning processes.
Option 1: National Military Strategy Expansion. Prior to the
end of the Cold War, the National Military Strategy Document,
coupled with the Base Case Global Family of OPLANs, closely
approximated a strategic plan. However, the mutation of the
national military strategy from the detailed and comprehensive
version contained in the National Military Strategy Document to
the unclassified, generalized form of the post-Cold War National
Military Strategy was by design, and for good reasons. The
arrival of a post-Cold War era of significantly diminished
military threats to U.S. national security and increased focus on
domestic social and fiscal issues brought with it an intense
demand on the part of Congress and the public for an explanation
of what changes in military force levels are required and why.
General Powell responded to the requirement for more widespread
communication of military strategy and the forces needed to
support it by publishing an easily understood, unclassified
National Military Strategy. This new National Military Strategy
was widely accepted because the Congress and the public were
generally unable to understand the new strategic environment with
any more clarity than it reflected. Nevertheless, the abandonment
of the National Military Strategy Document and shelving of the
Base Case Family of OPLANs were tantamount to inadvertent
abdication of the Chairman’s statutory strategic planning
responsibility.
Over half a decade has elapsed since the Berlin wall came
down. The “new world order,” or disorder as some have
characterized it, has taken sufficient form for critics to
suggest that it is time to develop a strategy for coping with
it.99 The question before us now is should the  Chairman replace
the National Military Strategy with a comprehensive, classified,
modern version of the National Military Strategy Document? The
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answer is no. The current National Military Strategy is not a
strategy per se, but a hybrid of national military doctrine and
policy. It is an institutionalized form of communication among
the Services, CINCs, OSD and other offices of the Executive
Branch, Congress, industry, academe, the public, and the
international community. It effectively informs all of the
general rationale for U.S. military forces, reaffirms national
security policies, encourages debate, reassures allies, and puts
potential adversaries on notice. This type of National Military
Strategy continues to serve the purposes for which it was created
and, therefore, warrants perpetuation. However, some measures
must be taken to fill the strategic planning void which resulted
from abandonment of the National Military Strategy Document and
the Global Family of OPLANs.
Option 2: Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan Expansion. An
alternative to changing the form and content of the National
Military Strategy is to expand the scope of the JSCP. As we noted
earlier, although the JSCP in its current form compiles planning
guidance, tasks, and force apportionments for all the CINCs under
one cover, it falls short of meeting the requirements of a
strategic plan. However, it could be expanded to contain a
strategic plan. This approach is appealing at first glance. The
précis of the National Military Strategy that appears at the
front of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan could be replaced
by a comprehensive strategic plan that specifies strategic
objectives and priorities, forces expected to be available for
each 2-year deliberate planning period, and the globally
integrated strategy for applying U.S and allied military
capabilities to accomplish the objectives. If this were done the
planning guidance, specific tasks, and force apportionments that
followed would be placed in an unambiguous strategic context.
This would allow the CINCs to devise more coherent and
interrelated theater strategies and develop operation plans that
collectively better reflect national level strategic priorities.
However, this alternative is unattractive for at least three
reasons. First, the JSCP in its current form is a large, complex
document and, as such, is difficult to produce. It must be
staffed with all the CINCs, Services, and agencies it directly
affects, and consensus-building is understandably problematic,
particularly given the JSCP’s near-term impact on service support
and training responsibilities and operational responsibilities of
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the CINCs. A document that combined the strategic plan and the
derivative planning guidance, tasks, and force apportionments
would likely prove too unwieldy to produce or change in a timely
fashion.
Second, the JSCP, a near-term document by design, is
impacted annually by the Contingency Planning Guidance. In its
current form, it has been able to accommodate annual 
fluctuations in contingency planning policy. While this may
remain true for the planning guidance and tasks sections of an
expanded JSCP, it would be untrue for the strategic plan section.
If the Chairman is to realize any stability in strategic
planning, subjecting his strategic plan to annual adjustments may
be unwise. Additionally, the Chairman’s strategic plans should be
viewed, in part, as military advice that informs the development
of contingency planning policy, not the reverse.
Third, notwithstanding its substantial volume, the JSCP is a
coherent, focused document. It serves one purpose–to provide for
the preparation and review of contingency plans. Given its
longevity in joint strategic planning, its purpose and format are
clearly understood and it has genuine utility for combatant
command, Service, and defense combat support agency planners. If
it were enlarged to incorporate the Chairman’s strategic plan, it
could lose its central focus and its utility may be lessened. For
these reasons, we conclude that the expansion of the JSCP is not
the preferred alternative for developing and promulgating
strategic plans.
Option 3: The National Military Strategic Plan. The most
appropriate alternative is the creation of a new document, the
National Military Strategic Plan. It would be a product of the
Joint Strategic Planning System, developed by the Joint Staff in
consultation with the CINCs and Services, and published by the
Chairman. It would be updated or republished as required in
anticipation of changes in the geostrategic environment, revised
national security objectives and strategic priorities, and/or
significant changes in fiscal guidance. The plan would be
harmonized with the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
and focused on the Future Years Defense Program, but would also
feature a long-range (FYDP + 14 years) section. It would derive
specific national military objectives from the broad national
security objectives expressed in the National Security Strategy
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and present them in measurable terms. It would establish a
priority of national military objectives and clearly describe a
strategy for attaining them within the Future Year Defense
Program period and the long-range planning period, as
appropriate.
The National Military Strategic Plan would proactively
orchestrate and guide the development of CINC theater strategies
to ensure that, in combination, they conform to the U.S. global
strategy. It would undergird the planning guidance, tasks, and
force apportionments provided to the CINCs in the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan. It would be particularly useful since it would
contain near-, mid-, and long-term strategies. Additionally, it
would enable the Services and defense combat support agencies to
predict more effectively the type and amount of military
capability they must build into their respective programs to
support the requirements of the CINCs. The National Military
Strategic Plan would also give them a preview of the standard
against which their programs would be assessed. In short,  the
National Military Strategic Plan would provide the critical nexus
connecting the strategic direction provided by the National
Command Authorities, the operation planning and requirements
determination by the CINCs, and the supporting military
capabilities developed by the Services and defense combat support
agencies.
Implementation of the National Military Strategic Plan
alternative would not be without difficulty, but is certainly
feasible within the current strategic planning framework. Much of
its basis would be developed during the Joint Strategy Review
process of the Joint Strategic Planning System. Having been
briefed on the results of the Joint Strategy Review, the Chairman
would issue guidance outlining the key elements of the plan. At a
minimum, the guidance would include national military objectives
and their priorities, anticipated resource levels for the Future
Year Defense Program period, and specific strategic elements that
should be reflected in the plan. Armed with the Chairman’s
guidance, the Joint Staff would develop the strategic plan and
coordinate it with the CINCs, Services, defense combat support
agencies, and selected officials within Office of the Secretary
of Defense. After approving the plan, the Chairman would present
it to the National Command Authorities in keeping with his
responsibility to provide military advice and assist in the
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strategic direction of the armed forces. While there would be no
requirement for the National Command Authorities formally to
approve the plan, their endorsement would help ensure that the
plan was resourced by the Future Years Defense Program.
Development of the National Military Strategic Plan,
therefore, would not disrupt any of the joint strategic planning
processes or initiatives currently in place, but would modify
some. For example, the National Military Strategic Plan could
incorporate the Unified Command Plan and the latter’s biennial
review would become part of the strategic planning process.
Additionally, the National Military Strategic Plan would inform
the Chairman’s triennial review of roles, missions and functions.
The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments would continue to be
performed. However, they would be guided by the military
capability requirements and strategic concepts reflected in the
National Military Strategic Plan. Additionally, each Joint
Warfighting Capability Assessment would no longer be a discreet
assessment but would be anchored to the National Military
Strategic Plan. The CINCs’ Integrated Priority Lists would be
submitted to conform to the National Military Strategic Plan and
thus have greater coherence. The Joint Warfighting Capability
Assessments would integrate and establish priorities for the IPLs
under the staff supervision of the Director of the Joint Staff.
The JROC would continue to be briefed on the integrated
priorities of the CINCs’ requirements, particularly those with
major program research and development implications. The
Chairman’s Program Recommendation would remain a Chairman’s
report to the  Secretary of Defense. In conformance to the
military capability requirements reflected in the National
Military Strategic Plan, it would become the means of reporting
the CINCs’ integrated priorities.
 A National Military Strategy, similar in form and content
to today’s document, would be developed from unclassified
information extracted from the National Military Strategic Plan.
The Chairman would be prepared to disclose classified aspects of
the National Military Strategic Plan, as necessary, to assist
selected members of Congress in deliberations on the defense
budget. The Joint Planning Document (JPD) would be assimilated
into the National Military Strategic Plan. It would no longer be
published as stand alone volumes. Neither the Defense Planning
Guidance nor the Joint Military Net Assessment would be based on
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scenarios, but on the National Military Strategic Plan. The
result would be a more efficient redirection of Joint Staff
energy toward strategic planning and not a net increase in the
Joint Staff’s work load. Finally, the National Military Strategic
Plan would provide the strategic basis for the development and
implementation of joint doctrine.
Conclusion.
This essay has argued that strategic plans should act as the
critical nexus connecting national security policy with operation
planning, military requirements determination, and military
capability development. Without strategic plans, joint strategic
planning will continue to be flawed by:
• inability to establish specific priorities for national
military objectives;
• unnecessary duplication in the development of military
capabilities;
• disaggregated, regionally-focused contingency plan- ning;
• inability to reach consensus on a more rational assignment
of service functions; and,
• continued difficulty in the development and imple-
mentation of joint doctrine.
10 USC, as amended by GNA, vests the Chairman with
responsibility for the development of “strategic plans.” The
Chairman holds the highest position in the strategic planning
hierarchy that is not directly constrained by political
considerations. This is not to infer that the Chairman is
oblivious or immune to political forces, but only to point out
that he may have greater political latitude than the Secretary of
Defense or the President. There is no statutory requirement for
the Secretary or the President explicitly to approve the
strategic plans prepared by the Chairman. The National Military
Strategic Plan should be considered part of his military advice
to the National Command Authorities. So advised, the National
Command Authorities may develop a clearer and more concise
approach toward implementing the National Security Strategy,
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without openly risking the political capital that a more precise
NSS might risk.
 When Georgy Arbatov, Chairman of the U.S.A.-Canada
Institute, said in late 1989 “We are depriving you of an enemy,”
few realized the prescience of his comment.100 The dissolution of
the Warsaw Pact, demise of the Soviet Union, and end of the Cold
War unsuspectingly cut away the anchor that provided continuity
in strategic planning for the U.S. Armed Forces. Set adrift, the
ship of state has successfully defended itself from encroaching
menacing vessels. It defeated a corrupt government of Panama,
punished and ejected Iraq from Kuwait, and restored the
legitimate government of Haiti. However, the United States cannot
drift indefinitely lest it unexpectedly run aground or be caught
up in an unforeseen storm. The United States needs proactive
strategic plans that will equip the U.S. Armed Forces to face the
challenges of the 21st century. It is time to set sail and get
underway. The strategic planning machinery is already in place.
All that is needed is a star by which to steer.
Recommendations.
• The Chairman should implement the National Military
Strategic Plan option described above.
• The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments should be
reoriented so they evaluate, integrate, and prioritize the CINCs’
requirements.
• The JROC should be divested of its oversight
responsibility for the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments,
reaffirming its original charter. Oversight of the Joint
Warfighting Capability Assessments should become a Director of
the Joint Staff responsibility on behalf of the Chairman and the
Vice Chairman. This would permit the assessments to be more
closely coordinated with the Joint Strategy Review.
• A principal input into the Joint Warfighting Capability
Assessment process should be the Integrated Priority Lists
submitted by the CINCs. This would help focus the identification
of military requirements on the CINCs, while continuing to ensure
their requirements are integrated with national level warfighting
concerns.
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• Continue to publish the Chairman’s Program Recommendation,
but as a product of the reoriented Joint Warfighting Capability
Assessment process.
• Base the biannual review of the Unified Command Plan
primarily on the National Military Strategic Plan.
• Continue the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan in its
current form, but base the guidance, force apportionments, and
taskings on the National Military Strategic Plan.
• Base the assessment of force capability strengths and
deficiencies identified by the CINCs on the National Military
Strategic Plan.
• Integrate and establish priorities for the CINCs’
requirements based upon the National Military Strategic Plan.
• Use the National Military Strategic Plan as the  basis for
assessing the OPLANs developed by the CINCs.
• Base Joint Military Net Assessments on the National
Military Strategic Plan, vice scenarios.
• Discontinue use of Defense Planning Guidance scenarios in
the development of service programs in favor of conformance to
the National Military Strategic Plan.
• Use the National Military Strategic Plan as input into the
triennial review of roles, missions and functions.
• The National Military Strategic Plan should guide the
development and revision of joint doctrine.
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